1 change over time and vary across productive activities; hence theoretical analysis of the innovative enterprise must be integrated with historical study" (Lazonick, 2002, p. 3) .
Historical patterns of innovation are characterized by complexity, reflecting the heterogeneous nature of economic activity, and diversity of processes of technology creation across sectors and countries. These characteristics make it problematic to construct overarching schemas of historical development. Nevertheless, some historians and analysts of innovation have developed taxonomies of epochs, often based on "critical technologies" that define whole periods of development. One form of this is the wave theory proposed by Schumpeter in Business Cycles, in which steam power drove the first industrial revolution, electricity the second industrial revolution, and so on. Other work that does not rely on wave theories also stresses the role of a small number of technologies in driving broader processes of economic growth. Although valuable, many of these frameworks overemphasize the importance of the allegedly critical technologies while slighting other areas of innovation and economic activity that are no less important. In what follows we challenge some of the historical discussions that stress the transformative effects of 'critical innovations'. Instead, we emphasize the complex multisectoral character of innovation, and hence the need to take seriously the co-existence of a range of innovation modes, institutional processes, and organizational forms.
Our discussion of innovation through time highlights changes in the structure of the innovation process in successive periods, and is informed by the innovation system concept (discussed in this book in chapters by Edquist, Asheim & Gertler, and Malerba) . In adopting this framework, we focus on the changing structure of economic activity, changes in relevant 2 institutions, and changes in patterns of knowledge generation and flows within emergent industrial economies. 1 We begin the discussion below by reviewing recent historical interpretations of the impulse to industrialization in the world economy. We then discuss the changing structure of the innovation process in different phases of industrialization, focusing on the 'first industrial 
THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Institutions, innovation and the impulses to growth
Sustained innovation-based development is a recent and unevenly distributed historical phenomenon. A substantial literature on 'world history' has sought to explain the rise of the West, and particularly the European breakthrough to sustained productivity growth, in the late eighteenth century. Why were some human societies able to break out of a Malthusian trap, shifting from "extensive" economic growth that relied on increased labor input and a wider division of labour to innovation-based intensive growth with sustained 3 rises in real output per head? An important contribution to this historical debate is Pomeranz (2000) , who argues that prior to the mid -eighteenth century, Europe, Japan, China, and India were at a broadly similar level of economic development -this was "a world of surprising resemblances." Why did only Northwestern Europe make the transition to innovation-based growth? Pomeranz suggests that two factors were crucial; the acquisition by the major European powers of colonies as markets for manufactures and sources of food and raw material, and the development within Europe of coal as a new energy source. 2 An alternative explanation for the industrialization of Northwest Europe stresses institutional changes (see Braudel 1984 , Wallerstein 1974 , Landes 1998 , focusing on the emergence of property rights as im pulses to innovation. A variant of this institutional analysis is provided by Jones (2003) who argues that technology-based growth has occurred at several points in world history; the challenge is less to understand growth than to understand the forces that prevent growth. He stresses the inhibitory role of political institutions that are based on surplus extraction by political and military elites. Only when such rulers are weakened by crisis do opportunities arise for gain from innovation. Since the political power of established political elites in Northwest Europe eroded during the 14 th -17 th centuries, the emergence of sustained, innovation-based economic growth first occurred in this region of the world economy.
There is disagreement within this literature over the timing of the divergence, as well as the relative importance of different factors in supporting the growth of such institutions as private property rights and the weakening of rent -seeking political and military elites. But all of the scholars adopting this approach emphasize institutional change as an indispensable precondition for sustained innovation-led growth.
Innovation in the "First Industrial Revolution"
Most economic historians regard the developments in Britain and Northw estern Europe from around 1760 as an economic and technological watershed. Innovation during this period is best conceptualized as an economy-wide process that involved technological, organizational, and institutional change, spanning many sectors and product groups. This view of British industrialization contrasts with the classic historical accounts that emphasize epochal technological breakthroughs in steam power and textile technologies (see for example Mantoux, 1955) . The debate is a significant one for the broader study of innovation, since important scholarly pieces in the field of innovation studies have followed the "key innovations" interpretation of the First Industrial Revolution (e.g., Freeman and Louca, 2002;  for an economic history of industrialization in this framework, see Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, 1998).
Sectoral patterns of technological advance: the patenting evidence
One important source of evidence on the pace and sectoral distribution of innovative activities during the Industrial Revolution is patent statistics from the period. Although the high cost of patenting (approximately £120 for England, at a time when the annual income of skilled worker was about £50) and limited access to patent attorneys by many inventors arguably make patent data a biased source of evidence, no other comparably comprehensive sources exist on innovative activity during the Industrial Revolution. MacLeod (1988) finds that patenting grew rapidly after 1750, especially in capital goods. The two technologie s for which patenting grew most rapidly during this period are power sources and textile 5 machinery. But patenting also expanded significantly in other capital-goods categories including agricultural equipment, brewing, shipbuilding, canal building, and metallurgy.
Although the share of all patenting accounted for by capital goods grew during the 1750-1800 period, this category nevertheless accounted for no more than 40% of British patents in the half century between 1750 and 1800.
A great deal of inventiv e activity during this period focused on consumer goods.
According to Berg (Berg 1998 ; see also Sullivan, 1990) , much of this consumer-goods patenting affected a vast number of small, novel products such as buckles and fasteners, cabinets and furniture, and spectacle frames. Indeed much of the patent activity within the textiles sector-roughly one-third-involved new products (Griffiths et al., 1992) . Much of the inventive activity in this key sector within the Industrial Revolution involved new thread types and fabrics, and focused on a consumer market.
Patent evidence thus suggests that the period of the Industrial Revolution was a period of broad technological change. Nevertheless, in recognition of the limitations of patent data for tracking innovative activity, we turn now to more qualitative evidence on the sectoral structure of innovation.
Sectoral patterns of change: technological histories
Steam Power and Textiles
Four innovations -the spinning jenny; the water frame; the spinning mule; and the automatic mule -were associated with dramatic growth in the British textiles industry of the First Industrial Revolution. Between the late eighteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century, the cotton textile industry grew spectacularly in the size of its output, in labour productivity, in the scale of enterprises, in capital employed, and its share of national 6 income. Value added in cotton rose from less than £500,000 in 1760 to about £25,000,000 by the mid-1820s. In spinning, the number of direct labor hours required to process 100 pounds of cotton declined from 300 in 1790 to 135 in 1820 (Mokyr 2002, pp. 50-51) , and the average annual input of raw cotton per factory rose by over 1, 000% during 1979 000% during -1850 000% during (Chapman, 1972 . Dramatic as these changes were, they should be kept in proportion: textiles made up about 25% of manufacturing output at their peak. Innovation and productivity were growing elsewhere as well, as we indicate below.
Another critical innovation of this period was the steam engine of James Watt, first introduced in 1775. Watt's innovation is commonly described as the emblematic technology of the industrial revolution (see Toynbee 1908 , Deane 1965 ). Yet von Tunzelmann's study of steam power (1978) showed that the machine diffused relatively slowly, that it had only modest economic advantages over existing power technologies (and hence could not significantly affect economic growth), and had limited backward and forward linkages with the rest of the British economy, further reducing its "catalytic" effects (See Textbox 1). As we noted earlier, the innovations that contributed to British economic growth and industrialization spanned a broader group of technologies and sectors.
TEXTBOX 1 HERE
Innovation in other sectors
Although industrialization necessarily was associated with a fall in the share of national output flowing from agriculture, British agriculture grew in absolute terms during 1750-1850 and was highly innovative. During this period, key innovations were developed in farm tools, cultivation implements (ploughs, harrows, mowers), sowing implements, harvesting equipment (reapers, rakes, hoes, scythes, winnowing and threshing devices etc), 7 and drainage equipment (for a detailed overview, see Bruland 2003) . Agricultural innovation was associated with the emergence by the 1830s of a specialized agricultural equipment industry, which in turn supported the growth of numerous small engineering works and foundries.
Closely linked with technical change in agricultural were innovations in the processing, distribution, and consumption of food, which during the Industrial Revolution (and after) dominated British manufacturing. Technological innovations in food preservation, refrigeration, baking, brewing and grain milling supported organizational innovation in the scale of production establishments and in the organization of production and firms. Baking was the first British industry to develop and use the production line, based on new techniques that supported more accurate timing of operations. Brewing and milling were the first sectors to deploy large, professionally managed enterprises with national distribution systems.
A similarly innovative sector was the glass industry, which manufactured widely used and differentiated products -windows, bottles and containers, lamps, and spectacles. Glass was one of the few large-scale production activities in early industrialization, and relied on experimentation and research to a degree not widely appreciated in many accounts of the role of science in technological innovation during this period. The most knowledge-intensive segment of glass production was optical glass, where developments of the technology deployed optical theory, pioneering the integration of science with production. Although this industrial revolution overall was far from a science-based phenomenon, developments in at least some of the key innovative sectors prefigured subsequent changes in the organization of innovation.
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These examples of innovation could easily be expanded to include sectors such as iron and steel, chemicals (alkalis and chlorine), pottery and ceramics, machinery and machine tools, instruments, mining, and paper and printing. The pervasiveness and extent of innovation in these and other industries once again suggests that innovation during the first Industrial Revolution was not confined to 'leading sectors' of the economy, but was present in virtually all sectors during the period. We cannot ignore the sectors such as textiles and steam power that have driven so much of the historiography of industrialization; but their role needs to be kept in economic and technological perspective. Although the search and learning processes employed by inventors during this period are best described as 'trial and error', this characterization inaccurately minimizes the extent and sophistication of the knowledge required for innovation in early industrialization. Indeed,
The organization of innovation and learning in early industrialization
Mokyr has proposed that a central factor in the Industrial Revolution was an "Industrial Enlightenment," associated with improvement in the quantity and accessibility of knowledge concerning industrial techniques. This "Enlightenment" included the surveying and codification of artisanal techniques through publishing manuals, handbooks, textbooks, and pamphlets on industrial practices (Mokyr 2002, 34-35 
Institutions and the organization of enterprise during the First Industrial Revolution
Institutional change that affected the organization of firms and production processes played an important role in the upsurge of innovation during early industrialization. This is a vast topic, and we focus on two crucial institutio nal changes -the development of new forms of company law and finance that supported the growth of corporate firms; and the rise of managerial control of production, which transformed workplace organization and scale. These institutional innovations together made possible the subsequent growth in factory production.
Most industrial enterprises operating during the 18 th century were extremely small.
Large-scale factories were uncommon before the early 19 th century, and the small-scale workshop or production unit was the primary organizational form for most of the period of early industrialization. These small firms were individually owned or were partnerships, locally financed, in which liability for debts was the personal responsibility of owners who usually acted as managers. Two institutional forms made possible an expansion in the scale of enterprises: joint-stock (i.e. limited liability) organization and the growth of financial networks.
Joint-stock associations emerged in the medieval period in Britain, but were permitted only via the explicit authorization of the state. A series of piecemeal reforms after 1825 were followed by legislation permitting the creation of companies with separate legal identity, limited liability and tradable shares. General legislation for the joint stock form was passed in 1844 and consolidated in the statutes of 1856 and 1862 (Mathias, 1983, p. 325; see Harris, 2000 for a comprehensive account). Although much industrial financing remained local and small in scale (see Hudson, 1986 , for an account of local networks' role in financing the woollen industry), these legal reforms enabled substantial growth in the financing and scale of industrial enterprises. But joint stock organization and accessible finance were necessary rather than sufficient conditions for enterprise growth. Even more significant was the development of management systems and managerial control.
Managers of these early industrial enterprises confronted serious challenges in the assembly and maintenance of a suitable workforce, the control of work, and the adoption of new techniques and organizational structures for production activities by a restructured workforce. Pollard highlights "two distinct, though clearly overlapping difficulties; the aversion of workers to entering the new large enterprises with their unaccustomed rules and discipline and the shortage of skilled and reliable labour" (Pollard 1965, p. 160) . The 11 emergence of rule -based disciplinary methods, the laborious construction of supervis ory systems, and the habituation of workers to an organized and controlled working day emerged slowly but were central developments of early industrialization. New management techniques that appeared during the Industrial Revolution permitted the development of larger, centralized production sites and of the mechanised factory. In turn, such sites permitted the application of power, the adoption of new industrial techniques, and closer managerial control over the organization and pace of work.
These organizational and managerial innovations were defining characteristics of the First Industrial Revolution. In pottery for example, the most important managerial innovator was Josiah Wedgwood, who developed a number of product innovations -new designs, new glazes and finishes, and new basic materials -and pioneered new marketing methods. But his most important innovations were organizational -the creation of an integrated workforce, the design of a plant organized around a set of production sequences, and above all the creation of a workforce subject to control and discipline (McKendrick, 1961 ; see textbox 2).
Wedgwood's innovations strengthened managerial power over the production workforce, which formed the central context for innovation (and struggle) in the later 19 th century.
An essential ingredient in the transformation of economic and innovative activity that characterized the First Industrial Revolution thus was the development of new techniques of economic organization and management. Another wave of institutional change and managerial innovation proved indispensable to the Second Industrial Revolution and an organizational innovation that was at its heart-the industrial research laboratory. (Chandler, 1977) . But few if any of these economically crucial organizational innovations relied on science. were pursuing degrees in the sciences (Haber, 1971, p. 51) . By contrast, the German technical universities alone enrolled 11,000 students in engineering and scientific degree programs by 1911. British government funding of higher education amounted to roughly £26,000 in 1899, while the Prussian government alone allocated £476,000 to support higher education. By 1911, these respective amounts stood at £123,000 and £700,000 (Haber, 1971, p. 45 and p. 51 ).
The Origins of Industrial Research
The institutional transformation of Germany's national innovation system was both a cause and an effect of the growth of the chemicals and electrical equipment industries.
Werner von Siemens of the Siemens electrical equipment firm was a founder of the German Association for Patent Protection in 1874, and the first national patent law in the new
German state was passed in 1877. Although the law did not cover dyestuff products, stronger intellectual property protection increased the ease with which firms could appropriate the returns to their R&D, and many of the largest German chemicals firms established formal in -house R&D laboratories after its passage.
The large, profitable firms that emerged in these science-based industries actively lobbied the German government for increased support of higher education (The "Club of Technology and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute were dedicated to "mission-oriented" fundamental research, much of which was longer-term in nature than the R&D performed in industry but nonetheless more applied than the work of university faculty (Beyerchen, 1988) .
The creation by German chemicals firms of in-house industrial research laboratories also was associated with change in the management and structure of these firms (See the importance of the independent inventor as a source of patents (Schmookler, 1957) .
But the in-house research facilities of large U.S. firms were not concerned exclusively with the creation of new technology. Just as the German dyestuff firms' laboratories had, these U.S. industrial laboratories also monitored technological developments outside of the firm and advised corporate managers on the acquisition of externally developed technologies.
As Pavitt notes in his chapter in this volume, in-house R&D in U.S. firms developed in parallel with independent R&D laboratories that performed research on a contract bas is (see also Mowery, 1983) . But over the course of the 20 t h century, contract-research firms'
share of industrial research employment declined. The complex and uncertain projects undertaken within many in-house research facilities did not lend themselves to "arms-length" organization.
As had been the case in Germany, the development of industrial research, as well as the creation of a market for the acquisition and sale of industrial technologies, benefited from a series of reforms in U.S. patent policy between 1890 and 1910 that strengthened and clarified patentholder rights (See Mowery, 1995) . Judicial tolerance for restrictive patent licensing policies further increased the value of patents in corporate research strategies.
Although the search for new patents provided one incentive to pursue industrial research, the impending expiration of these patents created another important impetus. Both American
Telephone and Telegraph and General Electric, for example, established or expanded their in-house laboratories in response to the intensified competitive pressure that resulted from the expiration of key patents (Reich, 1985; Millard, 1990, p. 156) . Intensive efforts to improve and protect corporate technological assets were combined with increased acquisition of patents in related technologies from other firms and independent inventors.
Schumpeter argued in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy that in-house industrial research had supplanted the inventor-entrepreneur (a hypothesis supported by Schmookler, 1957 ) and would reinforce, rather than erode, the position of dominant firms. The data on research employment and firm turnover among the 200 largest U.S. manufacturing firms suggest that during 1921-46 at least, the effects of industrial research were consistent with his predictions. Displacement of these firms from the ranks of the very largest was significantly less likely for firms with in-house R&D laboratories (Mowery, 1983) .
Innovation in the interwar chemicals industry
As we noted in the previous section, one of the critical science-based industries associated with this "Second Industrial Revolution" was chemicals. A comparison of U.S.
and German innovative performance in this industry highlights many of the points made above concerning the new institutional and organizational underpinnings of innovation during this period. Although German and U.S. chemicals firms had pioneered in the development of a new structure for innovation that relied on in-house R&D and the "routiniz ation of innovation," these two groups of firms pursued somewhat different innovative strategies during the interwar period following the creation of their R&D facilities. These differences highlight the influence of cross-national contrasts in market structure and resource endowments, factors that receded somewhat in importance after 1945.
One important point of contrast was the quality of scientific research in chemistry (as opposed to technological innovation) of leading firms and universities in the two nations. by the German chemicals industry to petroleum feedstocks (Stokes, 1994) . Here as well as elsewhere, the post-1945 revival of international trade and in vestment flows relaxed somewhat the constraints on technological innovation imposed by reliance on domestic natural resources. As Abramovitz (1994) and other scholars (Nelson and Wright, 1994 ) have pointed out, economic conditions in Europe and elsewhere in the global economy gradually came to resemble more closely those that had given rise to US supremacy in this sector.
A "THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION?" R&D AND INNOVATION DURING THE POST-1945 PERIOD
The Postwar Transformation
The structure of the innovation process in the industrial economies was transformed semiconductor firms. To reduce the risk that a system designed around a particular IC would be delayed by production problems or by the exit of a supplier, the U.S. military required its suppliers to develop a "second source" for the product, i.e., a domestic producer that could manufacture an electronically and functionally identical product. To comply with second source requirements, firms exchanged designs and shared sufficient process knowledge to ensure that the component produced by a second source was identical to the original product.
Electronics and ICT
Advances in electronics technology
These requirements spurred interfirm "spillovers" of knowledge and knowhow within the Although business demand for computers gradually expanded during the early 1950s, government procurement remained crucial. The projected sale of 50 machines to the federal government (a substantial portion of the total forecast sales of 250 machines) influenced IBM's decision to initiate the development of its first business computer, the 650 (Flamm, 1988) . New firms played a much more modest role in the early years of the business computer industry, however, in part because established firms such as IBM had developed powerful marketing organizations for electromechanical business equipment sales that were (with some difficulty) adapted to selling computers to their business customers (Usselman, 1993) . The appearance of new markets for computers that resulted from the development of Biotechnology has created new techniques for drug discovery, as well as new techniques for production of existing drugs, such as insulin (Henderson et al., 1998) And as Powell and Grodal note, much of the innovation process in the "new" pharmaceuticals industry that has been triggered by the rise of biotechnology relies on collaboration between the long-established major pharmaceuticals firms, who retain strong capabilities in marketing and management of the complex regulatory process, and new firms that specialize in biotechnology-based drug discovery.
A new "resource base" for innovation
The This shift from natural to "created" resource endowments as critical factors in international competition has obviously not been confined to the United States. Indeed, Nelson and Wright (1994) among others (Abramovitz, 1994;  
CONCLUSION
History rarely presents neat lessons for generalization, and the historical study of innovation is no exception. The primary lessons from our historical discussion concern the heterogeneity of the innovation process across time, across sectors and across countries.
Much of the surviving historical evidence that guides the historical study of innovation tends to highlight the formal and obscures the informal processes of knowledge accumulation, learning, and dissemination that underpin technological change and that contribute to its economic benefits. An important area for further research is the enrichment of our historical understanding of the informal processes for knowledge accumulation and diffusion that have been neglected in historical research on the "First Industrial Revolution" in particular. In addition, as we pointed out in our introductory discussion, a key historiographical mystery remains-why was northwest Europe the locus of the first transition to sustain ed, innovationled growth, rather than Asia or some other region of the global economy? Much of the discussion of this age-old question relies heavily on sweeping generalizations, and more research on the (asserted) failure of non-European economies to make the transition to sustained economic growth during this early period is needed.
One of the defining characteristics of innovation through time is change in the structure of the innovation systems that influence the development and dissemination of knowledge and innovations. The "innovation system" characteristic of the First Industrial Although it now is widely celebrated as a hallmark of 21 st -century "knowledgebased economies," science-based innovation is in fact a relatively recent development.
Indeed, it appears well after the institutionalization of R&D within industry in the early 20 th century in the United States and Germany. Moreover, even "high-technology" sectors such as biotechnology and semiconductors continue to rely on experimental methods that at their heart are "trial and error" approaches (see Pisano, 1997; Hatch and Mowery, 1998) . and shipbuilding (see also the chapter by Fagerberg and Godinho in this volume). But both of these episodes highlight the importance of broad institutional change, rather than the "strategic importance" of any single industry or technology, similarly to the three "Industrial
Revolutions" described in this chapter.
Since the economic effects of innovations depend on their widespread adoption (see Hall's chapter in this volume), it is important to recognize that the many of the important innovations of the First Industrial Revolution in fact diffused relatively slowly. For example, the Watt steam engine, described above as an emblematic innovation of the First Industrial Revolution, dif fused gradually through the British economy. By 1800, 25 years after the introduction of the Watt steam engine, Manchester (a central locus of industrialization in textiles) had about 32 engines, and Leeds (another emergent textiles center) about 20. By 1817 Glasgow had 45 engines, by 1820 Birmingham had about 60 engines, and by 1825 Bolton had 83. Growth rates of steam-generated horsepower averaged between 6 and 10 percent per year in the late 1830s, more than 50 years after the Watt engine's introduction. Von Tunzelmann (1978) argued that this gradual pace of diffusion reflected the high costs of steam engines and their fuels through the 1850s, long after the introduction of the engine. Similar points often apply to other important innovations of this period. The Roberts automatic spinning machine, said by no less an observer than Karl Marx to "open up a completely new epoch in the capitalist system", was a major innovation -the world's first truly automatic power machine. But it diffused slowly, fifty years passed before this machine accounted for a majority of the output of the UK cotton spinning industry.
Textbox 2: Josiah Wedgwood and "modern" management in pottery fabrication
In the second half of the 18 th century, rising incomes and increased coffee and tea consumption accelerated growth in the market for china and other types of glazed, fired clay plates, cups and related items. This was part of a wider growth in demand for "luxury" consumer goods. (Berg and Eger, 2003) The production of pottery was concentrated in Staffordshire in central England, and was dominated by small enterprises operated by craftsmen, often producing on a piecework basis. Production was controlled by individual craftsmen, and production rhythms and volumes were haphazard. Josiah Wedgwood transformed the industry by developing factory-based production techniques that supported the creation of an enterprise of unprecedented scale. Wedgwood's success rested on two achievements. Firstly, he successfully l obbied the British government to improve regional transportation infrastructure (a publicly financed turnpike was built in 1763 and a canal, on which Wedgwood sited his factory, was completed in 1771), thereby enabling his factory to serve the British market while reducing formerly exorbitant breakage rates. Secondly he introduced radical organizational innovations, developing new techniques for organizing production and managing the workforce (Bruland, 1989) .
Wedgwood, an acquaintance of Matthew Boulton, the entrepreneur who formed the successful steam-engine firm of Boulton and Watt, modeled his new production organization on Boulton's factory, emphasizing a physical layout that separated and sequentially organized the various operations that went into production of his china (Langton, 1984) . Consistent with this organization, Wedgwood assigned workers to specific tasks, relying on specialization to enhance skill and consistency in the performance of these tasks. Workmen "…were not allowed to wander at w ill from one task to another as the workmen did in the pre-Wedgwood potteries. They were trained to one task and they had to stick to it." (McKendrick, 1961, p. 32) .
Having reorganized the structure of production and jobs within his organization, Wedgw ood had to develop techniques to encourage and/or force workers to adapt to this new system. He invested heavily in retraining of experienced workers (with mixed results) and training of new employees, many of whom were young women (women accounted for 25% of his employees as of 1790). Even more important, however, was Wedgwood's emphasis on codification of technical guidelines for the performance of the various tasks in his factory and development of extremely detailed, written rules for worker behavior. Wedgwood also introduced sanctions and rewards for punctuality and absenteeism on the part of workers, going so far as to develop an early prototype of a timeclock for monitoring workers' attendance.
Wedgwood's new methods were significant organizational changes in the production of kitchenware and china, resting on a transformation of the nature and character of work itself. The new methods encountered considerable resistance from experienced workers, but he successfully created a production system without equal in the industry, employing 200 workers by 1790, less than 25 years after its foundation. Wedgwood himself became enormously wealthy, and the firm survived as an independent entity into the 20 th century.
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Textbox 3: The foundation of R&D laboratories by Bayer and Du Pont
Bayer's foundation of a laboratory was triggered in part by a realization among the firm's senior management that it was unable to compete effectively with Hoechst and BASF (which had founded research laboratories respectively in 1877 and 1878), as well as the growing difficulties that Bayer faced in forming strong linkages with leading university research chemists. In 1883, Carl Duisberg, who later served as the first director of Bayer's in -house research facility and the firm's CEO, was sent by Bayer managers to work with chemistry faculty at the University of Strasbourg (then a German university), before returning to Bayer to begin work in the firm's R&D laboratory (a small room just off the main production floor in Bayer's plant). At the same time, Bayer sought to strengthen its links with German university chemists through other tactics, including the negotiation of contracts with leading research chemists and the funding of research by new Ph.D. degreeholders in university or technical university laboratories.
Duisberg's first laboratory was at best an appendage to Bayer's main production facility, but his success in dyestuff synthesis led to an expansion in his staff. Nevertheless, Duisberg's group had important responsibilities in production engineering and problemsolving, as well as marketing, until roughly 1890. Only in 1891 was a dedicated laboratory established at Bayer and a clear distinction made within the organization between R&D and workaday technical support (see Meyer-Thurow, 1982) . Du Pont's Eastern Laboratory (which was bas ed at the Repauno site) was the first laboratory to be physically and organizationally separated from the manufacturing operations of the firm. Its R&D activities were devoted almost entirely to improvements in manufacturing processes for Du Pont's existing product line of dynamite and high explosives. By contrast, the Experimental Station, founded one year later, focused on the development of new products and improved applications of Du Pont's smokelessgunpowder products. The Experimental Station also monitored and evaluated inventions from sources outside of the Du Pont Company.
A U.S. government antitrust suit against Du Pont forced the divestiture of a portion of its black powder and dynamite businesses in 1913, and the firm used its R&D laboratories to diversify its product lines through R&D and the acquisition of technologies from external sources during and after World War I.
A collection of independent but interconnected networks built and managed by a variety of organizations, the Internet owes its success to institutional as well as technological innovations (Mowery and Simcoe, 2002) . Research in computer networking was supported by gover nments in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States during the 1960s. A central goal of Defense Department computernetworking research was to enable more effective use by researchers in universities, government, and industry of the small number of large research computers then available.
Research and early experiments in computer-networking technology in all three nations led to the development of prototype networks. But the ARPANET, deployment of which in 1969 was sponsored by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, was far larger and linked more diverse groups of researchers than the prototype networks in France and the United Kingdom. Computers attached to the ARPANET "backbone" communicated on the basis of a shared set of protocols (TCP/IP), another outcome of DARPA research. Later policy decisions by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and other federal agencies that shared responsibility for the backbone encouraged standardization of Internet infrastructure. These agencies also promoted expansion of the Internet beyond the science and engineering communities. In 1990, the U.S. Defense Department transferred managerial control over the Internet infrastructure to NSF, and five years later NSF transferred responsibility for the core network to the private sector.
Software protocols and architectural elements critical to the Internet had been placed in the public domain from the beginning. Open standards encouraged expansion by making available the details of core innovations and lowering entry barriers for firms that supplied hardware, software, and networking services. State and federal regulation of telecommunications aided the rapid diffusion of the Internet in the United States by maintaining low, time-insensitive rates. The 1982 settlement of the federal government's antitrust suit against AT&T restructured the U.S. telecommunications industry and encouraged entry by new service providers, spawning further innovation. But through the late 1980s, the Internet was used mainly by researchers from the academic, industrial and government communities throughout the world.
Key inventions (HTML and HTPP, developed by Berners-Lee) from CERN, the European particle -physics installation, were used by U.S. technology developers (a group of graduate students in computer science at the University of Illinois, among whom the best-known is Marc Andreesen, who moved to Netscape to commercialize a browser based on the MOSAIC technology developed at the University) to produce the first "browser" in 1994, which vastly expanded use of the Internet and led to the "WorldWide Web." The large "installed base" of desktop computers in the United States was a powerful impetus to the "user-led" innovation that quickly produced a vast array of new applications and eventually, a speculative bubble in the equity markets. But the "radical innovation" of the WorldWide Web in fact represented a culmination of nearly 30 years of research and innovations in networking protocols and software, as well as high-speed data transmission, routers, and computer processing and memory technologies. 2 See Peer Vries (2002) for an overview and critique of the literature in this field.
3 "…scientific explanations proved to be reliable guides to the commercial development of new processes and products. Unlike the unrestrained inventions of myth and fable, they could not be ignored by industrial firms except at the risk of being displaced by rival firms. But to understand and apply scientific exp lanation required years of training in the theology of an invisible pantheon of scientific entities. That requirement professionalized industrial science and diminished the role of artisan invention." (Rosenberg and Birdzell, p. 253) 
